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THE DEFENSE OF MISUSE IN COPYRIGHT ACTIONS
By ANCEL W. LEWIS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the equitable maxim that one who comes into equity
must do so with "clean hands" there has developed in patent actions
a substantial body of case law concerning the defense of misuse.
The purpose of this article is to determine to what extent the mis-
use defense is applicable to copyright actions.
II. UNCLEAN HANDS
The defense of "unclean hands" was successfully asserted in
an early copyright infringement action, Thompson v. American Law
Book Company,' in which the publisher of a copyrighted law ency-
clopedia was denied relief on the grounds that he had actually
copied paragraphs from other copyrighted material. Thus, if it were
piracy in one party, it was piracy in another; and a literary pirate
was not entitled to consideration in a court of equity. Shortly there-
after, in Bentley v. Tibbals,2 the court was quick to point out that
not all wrongdoings or inequitable conduct on the part of the copy-
right proprietor would preclude relief on the basis of "unclean
hands," and allowed relief for copyright infringement despite cer-
tain misconduct. Here the plaintiff, Bentley, a subject of Great
Britain, copyrighted in the United States a first book and, subse-
quently, copyrighted in Great Britain a second similar but more
complete book. The second book was sold in the United States in
violation of the statute requiring imported books to be printed from
type set in the United States. Tibbals, when sued for infringement
of the first book, asserted, inter alia, that this violation of the
United States' statute was of such misconduct as to preclude the
plaintiff's relief. The court held for the plaintiff on the ground that
only that misconduct connected to or affected by the matter in liti-
gation could preclude relief; that the wrongful importation was an
offense against the United States and in no way prejudiced the
defendant. Therefore, the maxim did not apply.
Courts of equity have, subsequently, denied infringement relief
to copyright proprietors on the grounds of "unclean hands" where
the copyrighted manual of instruction alleged facts which could not
possibly be true;3 where the corporate plaintiff knew when he pur-
chased the copyright on a book that the seller had pirated the mate-
rial for the book from the defendant; 4 and where copyrighted mo-
tion pictures were indescent and immoral.5
Courts of equity have granted injunctive relief to the copyright
* Third year student, University of Denver College of Low. This paper won First Prize in the
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers, at George Washington University Law School where the author was also a student.
1 122 Fed. 922 (2d Cir. 1903).
2 223 Fed. 247 (2d Cir. 1915).
3 Stone and McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 Fed. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
4 Colonial Book Co, v. Oxford Book Co., 45 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd 135 F.2d 463
(2d Cir. 1943).
5 Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947). For additional cases where the copyright
proprietor was found to have "unclean hands," see Gaye v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp, 416 (D. Mass. 1958);
Farrel v. Tostado, 67 U.S.P.Q. 170 (S.D. Calif. 1944).
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proprietor, despite an "unclean hands" defense, where a trade cata-
log including a previous catalog of another, used with permission
and information from jobbers and manufacturers, was copyrighted; 6
and where a copyright was placed on a doll's body despite the fact
that the body had been previously published without a copyright
notice.
7
However, the right of a copyright proprietor to charge what
price he pleased was held to be within the rights bestowed by the
copyright law, and not subject to an "unclean hands" defense.8 In
this case the defendant, Hillsgrove, in answer to the infringement
action, asserted that the copyright owner had extracted an exor-
bitant and unconscionable rate for the privilege of reproducing
music, since the defendant was required to pay at a rate more than
double that charged the defendant's predecessor, and which was
grossly disproportionate to the rate charged the defendant's compe-
titors. The copyright owner moved to strike the answer, and the
motion was granted. Some pertinent language was used concerning
the rights given to a copyright owner.
The owner of the copyright . . . may refrain from vending
... [it and may] . . . exclude others from using his prop-
erty.***
Copyright is a right exercised by the owner during the
term at his pleasure and exclusively for his own profit and
forms the basis for extensive and profitable business enter-
prises.
Additionally:
The right of a patentee, owner of a copyright, or owner of
a secret process is merely the right of exclusion or debar-
ment. The holder of such a property right . . . is a czar in
his own domain .... He may fix such prices as he pleases.
He may sell at one price to one person, and another to an-
other person. He is not required to give reasons or deal
fairly with purchasers.1 '
In Harms v. Cohen," the court carved a large area of the copy-
right proprietor's improper activity out of the "clean hands" de-
fense, holding that it is not a defense to a copyright infringement
action that the plaintiffs have violated the anti-trust statutes. In this
case, the plaintiff member of ASCAP (American Society of Com-
posers and Authors), which granted blanket licenses on performing
rights of musical compositions assigned to it by its members, sued
the defendant owner and operator of a theater where the motion
pictures were exhibited, and where the compositions were used
without permission. The defendant, Cohen, argued that this activity
of ASCAP was a violation of the Sherman Act. The court held it
was no defense that the plaintiff had formed an unlawful combina-
tion in violation of the Sherman Act, the remedies under that Act
being exclusive. The court compared a situation where a defendant
6 R.R. Donelly & Sons Co. v. Haber, 43 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
7 Ideal Toy Corp. v. J-Cey Doll Co., 290 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1961). For additional cases where
the copyright proprietor was not denied relief on the ground of "unclean hands," see Wihtol v.
Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Iowa 1961); Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
8 Buck v. Hillsgrove Country Club, 17 F. Supp. 643 (D.R.I. 1937).
9 Id. at 645, citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
10 Id. at 645, citing Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Platt, 142 Fed. 606, 610 (C.C.N.D. III. 1906).
11 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
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was accused of stealing cattle from growers engaged in the price
fixing of cattle prices, resulting in restraint of trade in the beef
market. A person stealing would not be relieved of liability because
the property was stolen from a party violating the anti-trust laws.
Those laws did not grant the privilege to steal with impunity the
property of others engaged in a monopolistic combination.
Another landmark case cited for this proposition is Vitagraph,
Inc., v. Grobaski, 2 where a motion to dismiss an action for copy-
right infringement on the ground that certain exhibition contracts
for motion pictures were illegal under the Sherman Act, was denied.
Here the defendants were licensed to exhibit copyrighted motion
pictures on specified dates. Subsequently, a decision was handed
down which held such exhibition contracts to be violative of the
Sherman Act, because they excluded certain theatres from the op-
portunity of dealing in a free market. The court held that a Sher-
man Act violation could not be a defense in a copyright infringe-
ment action:
It seems to be quite generally held that illegality of a com-
bination cannot be interposed as a defense to suits for in-
fringement of copyrights, patents, or trade marks, and that
courts of equity will entertain such suits; the general prin-
ciple being that these suits are regarded as being based not
upon contract but upon tort. It is said that the fact one has
entered into some illegal contract does not authorize others
to injure him with impunity.
13
A few decisions subsequent to the Harms and Vitagraph cases have
adopted the general proposition that an anti-trust violation is no
defense in a copyright infringement action.1
4
In Folmer Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Serv., 5 the court
suggested a situation where an illegal combination should be denied
relief under the maxim. In this case the plaintiff, Folmer, was al-
leged to be a member of an illegal combination that was manufac-
turing and selling cameras in violation of the anti-trust statutes. The
court acknowledged the general rule of the Vitagraph case, but
stated:
But, if the illegal combination is a part of the actual trans-
action about which the plaintiff seeks equitable relief, and
to grant such relief would amount to invoking the aid of
the court in furthering such illegal combination, then under
the doctrine of "unclean hands" the plaintiff might be de-
prived of its rights to equitable relief. 16
The court then ordered that part of the defense which alleged that
the plaintiff was a member of an illegal combination be stricken,
and such portion which charged the plaintiff with "unclean hands"
1246 F.2d 813 (W.D. Mich. 1931).
13 Id. at 814, citing Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 42 F.2d 873 (D. Colo. 1930);
Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (6th Cir. 1912); Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amuse-
ment Co., 298 Fed. 470, 480 (E.D. S.C. 1924); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. UlIman, 186 Fed. 174 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
14 Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3rd Cir. 1959); Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Harms, Inc. v. Sonsom House Enter-
prises, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Buck v. Cerere, 45 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1942);
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v. WCAU Broadcasting Co., 35 F. Supp. 460
(E.D. Pa. 1940); Buck v Spanish Gables Inc., 26 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1938); Buck v. Newsreel, Inc.,
25 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1938).
15 41 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass. 1941).
16 Id. at 320, citing Delaware, L.& W.R.R. v. Frank, 110 Fed. 689, 696 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1901).
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be retained, thus suggesting that the proper approach is to use"unclean hands" rather than anti-trust violation where the plaintiff
has entered into some type of monopoly activity in connection with
his copyright.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF MISUSE
The actual "misuse" defense, based on the theory of a monopoly
extension, as misconduct to allow application of the "unclean hands"
defense was initally set forth in patent case law in Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.'7 The plaintiff patentee of
a movie projector feeder licensed it on the condition that the feeder
be used solely for projecting the patentee's motion pictures. The
court denied the patentee all relief against the infringer on the
ground that such a tying condition was beyond the scope and pur-
pose of the patent and, thereby, constituted misuse of the patent.
The actual misuse doctrine did not take full shape in patent
case law until Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,' 8 where the
patentee of a machine for depositing salt tablets was requiring li-
censees to use with the patented machines only tablets sold by the
patentee. The court held that the patentee had misused the patent
by extending his monopoly beyond that granted in the patent. Also,
the court decided that where the patent is used to control unpat-
ented products, the successful prosecution of an infringement suit,
even against one who is not a competitor in such sale, is a powerful
aid in the maintenance of the attempted monopoly of an unpatented
article and, thus, a contributing factor in thwarting the public policy
underlying the grant of the patent. It is the adverse effect on the
public interest of a successful infringement suit, in conjunction
with the patentee's course of conduct, which disqualifies him to
maintain the suit, regardless of whether the particular defendant
has suffered from the misuse of the patent. The court concluded
that the patentee, like the other holders of an exclusive privilege
granted in furtherance of a public policy, may not claim protection
of his grant by the courts where it is being used to subvert that
policy.
The first copyright infringement case where the copyright pro-
prietor was charged with misconduct in an infringement action,
17 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
Is 314 US. 488 (1942).
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after the Morton Salt case, was noted in the Seventh Circuit. 19
Plaintiff was the copyright proprietor of a musical composition, and
vested the public performing rights therein in ASCAP. The defend-
ant operated a place of public entertainment and admitted infringe-
ment, but contended that because the plaintiff had failed to comply
with the provisions of a certain Wisconsin statute requiring a com-
poser to obtain a license for public rendition, that he had "unclean
hands." The court held that this misconduct did not allow applica-
tion of the "unclean hands" maxim. The court applied the effect
test, saying that the plaintiff's dereliction in this regard in no wise
prejudiced the defendant or justified him in confiscating the plain-
tiff's property, and to induce denial of relief under this maxim, the
plaintiff's conduct must be such that the prosecution of his rights
would of itself involve protection of the wrongdoing.
The court took cognizance of the Morton Salt doctrine, and
language to the effect that a court of equity can appropriately with-
hold its aid where the plaintiff is using the right contrary to the
public interest. However, they distinguished the present case on the
basis that the plaintiff in Morton Salt was seeking to extend his
lawful monopoly beyond the scope of the patent, and thus the illegal
action which warranted application of the "unclean hands" doctrine
to preclude relief was extricably intermingled and connected with
the cause of action, or directly related to it. In this case, the court
felt that the violation of the Wisconsin statute was collateral to the
cause of action and not directly related to it.
"Misuse," or the claim by the defendant that the copyright pro-
prietor has used his exclusive grant for purposes beyond those
which the Copyright Act has given and, therefore, is guilty of such
misconduct as to be denied relief in a court of equity, was first suc-
cessfully asserted in a copyright case in 1948, M. Witmark & Sons
v. Jensen.2 0 Plaintiff members of ASCAP, having recording rights
and performing rights in their musical compositions, licensed the
recording rights to motion picture producers and allowed ASCAP
to handle exclusively the performing rights, which ASCAP licensed
as a group under a blanket license to theatres. Thus, the copyright
owners pooled all license fees on performing rights, which amounted
to some 80% of all music in motion picture films. The defendant
theatre asserted as a defense to an infringement action that the
plaintiffs had extended their copyrights by their method of doing
business, and that such practices gave them, through ASCAP, an
economic advantage and control beyond that granted by the copy-
right laws. The court agreed that the plaintiffs tied their copyrights
with other copyrighted music and thus had shared in rewards which
were obtained from other copyrighted material. Instead of having
a single monopoly of a particular piece of copyrighted music and
the benefits which that might afford, every copyright owner of
music in ASCAP had obtained the added economic power and bene-
fit which the combined ASCAP control gave them and their asso-
ciates. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs had extended their
copyrights beyond the copyright law and denied equitable relief to
the copyright owner.
1) Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943).




In the area of monopoly extension of the copyright by certain
licensing practices of the copyright proprietor, most of the litigation
has come up in private treble damage anti-trust actions, in which
the courts consider whether the copyright proprietor has gone be-
yond his grant. Early Supreme Court cases condemned, as extend-
ing the copyright monopoly, imposition of price control over future
sales of an article after passing title.21 The Supreme Court also con-
demned an agreement with the copyright owner, binding the dis-
tributor of copyrighted films, when licensing subsequent runs of
films at other theatres to require the licensee to observe minimum
admission price and to abstain from exhibiting the picture in a
double bill.
22
Blockbooking was found to be beyond the grant of a single
copyright monopoly in the landmark case of U.S. v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc.23 Blockbooking is the practice, by a motion picture dis-
tributor, of licensing copyrighted films in individual groups to ex-
hibitors. The court in this case conceded that the copyright proprie-
tor was not uniting one copyrighted film to an uncopyrighted film,
but felt that conditioning the licensing of one film upon the licens-
ing of another produced the same result and gave the copyright pro-
prietor not only the reward due from licensing a single film, but
also an extension of the monopoly by requiring the licensee to ac-
cept one or more other films.
24
Blanket licensing of the public performing rights of musical
compositions, by the organization known as ASCAP, was held to be
an addition to the monopoly of the copyright, in a 1948 anti-trust
private treble damage action.25 The court felt the case had all the
same features as the Paramount case.
However, a license agreement whereby the copyright proprietor
granted the exclusive right to distribute 16mm prints of thirty speci-
fic copyrighted motion pictures, with a provision requiring the li-
censee to order exclusively from the licensor, was held to be within
the copyright grant.26 The court reasoned that the copyright pro-
prietor, by virtue of 17 USC, Sec. 1 (d), had the exclusive right to
reproduce the works and license or retain the right to reproduce its
films, and it could not be said that the grant of a single license only
enlarged the monopoly. The Paramount case was distinguished as
a case where films were forced on the licensee, but the court in this
case felt the licensee wanted "tied-in" service and only objected to
purchasing it from the copyright owner.
Acquiring of performance rights to copyrighted "Gospel Music,"
by affiliation agreements with the copyright owners, by a major
21 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1907); Strous v. American Publishers Ass'n, 231
U.S. 222 (1913).
22 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1938).
23 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). In U.S. v. Loews, Inc., 83 S.Ct. 97 (1962), the Supreme Court
held that blockbooking of copyrighted motion picture feature films to television companies was a
compounding of the statutorily conferred monopoly, relying on the Paramount case. An attempt to
distinguish the Paramount case, concerning movie exhibitors, on the ground that the films were
being sold to television exhibitors and constituted less than 8% of the programming, was flatly
rejected.
24 See Pope Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp. & AAP, Inc., 277 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.
1960), where blockbooking was held to be monopoly extension.
25 Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
26 Cardinal Films, Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 148 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
1964
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
licensing organization and, in turn, blanket licensing of these rights
was held to be an addition to the copyright monopoly.2 7 The organ-
ization, in its affiliation agreements, agreed to reimburse the indi-
vidual author-licensor by charging the expenses incurred from the
collective licenses, deducting fifty per cent of the profits and allo-
cating the remainder to the author-licensor according to his contri-
bution. The rights were then licensed primarily to radio and tele-
vision stations, which had the choice of taking one or a group. The
court condemned this pooling of rights, because it made it possible
for the copyright owner to set the price and share in the other's
copyright, thus adding to the monopoly of the single copyright. The
court also considered the procedure similar to blockbooking, which
was condemned in the Paramount case, and admitted that while the
organization did not refuse to issue a per piece license, it gave the
user who must choose the blanket license as the lesser of two evils,
no genuine choice between the two types of licenses. An anti-trust
action was brought by a group of authors and composers against a
similar major licensing organization, Broadcast Music Inc., but was
dismissed in part because the plaintiffs were found to have no
standing to sue.
2 8
Where the copyright owner of certain motion pictures granted
an exclusive license to produce and distribute standard advertising
accessories for the films, for a term of years, the Third Circuit found
no copyright monopoly extension.2 9 The court reasoned that because
the standard accessories could be created and manufactured for only
one motion picture, they were noncompetitive in nature and, there-
fore, no mere increase in the number of licenses obtained by one
individual accomplishes a restraint upon trade or limitation in the
course of supply. It is not entirely clear why this activity is not a
monopoly extension beyond that granted in the copyright, since the
copyright owner was controlling uncopyrighted advertising posters
created by another, obviously a commercially competitive item.
Such practices were clearly condemned by the Morton Salt case.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISUSE DEFENSE
Because a copyright is a limited monopoly which vests in the
proprietor economic advantages that can easily be used to gain
additional economic advantage, the problem of anti-trust violation
is apparent. The early general rule of the Harms and Vitagraph
cases, that an anti-trust violation is not a defense, has been consid-
erably weakened. The more recent cases give recognition to the mis-
use doctrine and examine the question as to whether or not the
copyright proprietor has extended his monopoly by entering into
some contract, combination, or conspiracy to gain benefits beyond
those granted in a single copyright.
The defense of misuse of copyright was asserted successfully
in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts.30 The defendant, who re-
produced color lithographs of the plaintiff's mezzotint engravings,
defended, inter alia, on the ground that by reason of the plaintiff's
27 Affiliated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc, 160 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
28 Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
29 L-wlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 270 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1959).
3074 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), off'd 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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contracts with other members of the Fine Arts Guild to limit pro-
duction and to maintain a minimum price, it had violated the anti-
trust laws, had thereby misused the copyright, and should be denied
relief. The district court considered the misuse of patent cases, but
concluded that similar destruction of copyright monopoly for its
misuse in violation of the Sherman Act had been consistently re-
fused by the courts, the remedy under the anti-trust acts being
exclusive. The court of appeals did not explicitly hold that the de-
fense of misuse of copyright in violation of the Sherman Act either
was or was not sufficient in law, but applied a novel balancing test.
The court stated: "All the foregoing is important since recently the
Supreme Court, in similar context, has given the 'unclean hands'
doctrine a somewhat narrowed scope."' It then stated:
We have here a conflict of policies: (a) that of preventing
piracy of copyrighted matter and (b) that of enforcing the
anti-trust laws. We must balance the two, taking into ac-
count the comparative innocence or guilt of the parties, the
moral character of their respective acts, the extent of the
harm to the public interest, the penalty inflicted on the
31 Id., 191 F.2d at 106, citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,
214 (1950).
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plaintiff if we deny it relief. As defendants' piracy is un-
mistakably clear, while the plaintiffs' infraction of the anti-
trust laws is doubtful and at most marginal, we think the
enforcement of the first policy should outweigh enforce-
ment of the second.
32
It is not clearly apparent from the facts why the court adopted
the balancing test. Perhaps a more accurate test would have been
to look to the earlier "unclean hands" cases and apply the exception
suggested in the Bentley case by looking at the connection between
the unlawful activities of the copyright proprietor and the role in
those activities played by the copyright; and further, to apply the
rule of the Folmer case by determining if a grant of relief would
amount to invoking the aid of the court in furtherance of an illegal
combination.
Where the copyright proprietor was seeking to recover damages
for breach of a license agreement on copyrighted motion pictures,
rather than equitable relief for infringement, an anti-trust violation
was raised and the court indicated that this may be a good defense.33
The license agreement included a schedule of admission prices and
a provision that during the exhibition period the admission prices
should be no less than the prices listed in the schedule. The defend-
ant, Coomer, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
provision was illegal in violation of the Sherman Act. The court
held that an issue of fact existed and denied the defendant's motion.
It was suggested that an anti-trust violation might be a good de-
fense, but concluded that this provision was reasonably and nor-
mally adapted to secure the copyright owner the pecuniary reward
to which he was entitled under a copyright monopoly.
In an action for copyright infringement, the defendant admitted
infringement, but asserted as an affirmative defense and counter-
claim that by reason of the copyright proprietor's anti-trust viola-
tion, he had misused his copyright. The jury's instruction as to the
plaintiff's conduct indicated that an anti-trust violation was a good
defense.34 Plaintiff, engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribu-
tion of woolen goods, was suing on a copyrighted label. The defend-
ant asserted, as an anti-trust violation, that by reason of an unlaw-
ful conspiracy to eliminate the defendant from competing against
the plaintiff, the plaintiff had been guilty of "misuse" of such rights
granted under the Copyright Act and should be denied any protec-
tion. The court stated:
The defenses are based on the doctrine of "unclean
hands." 35 If the jury finds for the defendant on the counter-
claim, then, since the special defenses would be a complete
defense, the trial judge could entertain a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the jury's verdict dis-
posed of the issues presented by the special defenses. 36
32 Id., 191 F.2d at 106, citing West 52nd Theatre Co. v. Tyler, 178 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1949);
Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49, 53 (7th Cir. 1949); Standard Oil Co. v.
Clark, 163 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1947); Interstate Hotel Co. v. Remick Music Corp., 157 F.2d 744
(8th Cir. 1946).
33 Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Coomer, 99 P. Supp. 481 (E.D. Ky. 1951).
34 Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Alexander's Dept. Stores, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
35 Id. at 407, citing Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Sac. of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
80 F. Supp. 888, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); General Elec. Co. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 45 F. Supp. 714,
718 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
36 Id., 11 F.R.D. at 407.
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More recently, an anti-trust defense to a preliminary injunction
was considered where a license agreement provision required the
licensee not to release motion picture rights until all first class plays
had closed, in conjunction with a dramatist guild agreement requir-
ing its members to place such restrictions therein.3 7 The defendant
asserted that the restrictions were illegal, immoral and unenforce-
able, but the court granted the injunction on the ground that the
restrictions were within the licensing power of the copyright owner,
and found nothing contrary to public policy or in violation of law.
It is significant, however, that the court considered the question as
to whether the condition in the license agreement, along with the
plaintiff's membership in the guild, was a violation of the Sherman
Act, although it concluded that it was not.
Finally, in United Artists Associated Inc. v. N.W.L. Corp.3 the
plaintiff was a Delaware corporation licensing motion pictures to
television stations. The defendant received, reproduced, and dis-
tributed television broadcasting signals carrying telecasts of motion
pictures owned by the plaintiff and answered the infringement ac-
tion asserting, inter alia, misuse as a defense. It is apparent, al-
though not specifically set forth in the opinion, that the misuse al-
leged was some type of anti-trust violation, as the court referred
to the long line of earlier cases which held that an anti-trust viola-
tion is not a defense in copyright actions. Plaintiff moved to strike
from the defendant's answer, for insufficiency, the defense of mis-
use of copyright. However, the court held that the insufficiency of
the defense was not clearly apparent, and stated the issue as follows:
Does misuse of copyright bar an infringement action wheth-
er or not the misuse also violates the anti-trust laws; and is
the privilege to raise that defense grounded, not upon in-
jury to defendant, but on the misused monopoly's unen-
forceabilty against anyone?
39
The court then stated:
While a court of equity will withhold relief against even a
stranger to the misuse, where the patentee is using the pat-
ent privilege contrary to the public interest,4 0 it is a sub-
stantial question whether a like rule, invocable in the same
manner, is applicable to an action for infringement of copy-
right.
41
The court then referred to M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen -4 2 and
to Alfred Bell & Co.,4 3 concluded that the insufficiency of the de-
fense of misuse of copyright was not clearly apparent, and denied
the defendant's cross-motion. This decision is significant in that it
allows the defendant to have the question of misuse considered
when the defense appears to be an anti-trust violation, thus indicat-
ing that some type of anti-trust conduct can be asserted in a misuse
defense. Further, it takes cognizance of the misuse defense in a
copyright infringement action.
37 Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 143 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
38 198 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
39 Id. at 957.
40 Id. at 958, citing Mercoid Corp. v. Midcontinent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Reg. Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
41 Id., 198 F. Supp. at 958.
42 Supra note 20.
43 Supra note 30.
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Other recent copyright cases indicate a willingness to consider
the question as to whether or not the copyright proprietor has ex-
tended his monopoly. Copyrighted graphic charts used in combina-
tion with a recording thermometer, on which the patent had ex-
pired, was quickly condemned as an attempt to extend the copyright
indefinitely.4" The court reasoned that each new machine produced
by the plaintiff would require a different chart with a different
measurement, which afforded the excuse for obtaining another
copyright, and thereby allowed the plaintiff to extend indefinitely
the fifty-six years of protection.
45
The Supreme Court considered a misuse defense recently, in
Mazer v. Stein.46 The plaintiff, Stein, had copyrighted statuettes as
works of art and subsequently used them for commercial exploita-
tion as lamp bases. The defendant, Mazer who had substantially
reproduced Chinese copies of the statuettes and embodied them in
lamps, defended, inter alia, on the ground that, by reason of the
plaintiff's commercial exploitation, he had misused his copyrighted
work of art. The court held that this was not a misuse of the copy-
right, and in support thereof stated:
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward
to the owner a secondary consideration. '47 However, it is
"intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights
to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome require-
ments; 'to afford greater encouragement to the production
of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the
world'.
48
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the tal-
ents of authors and inventors "Science and Useful Arts."
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with services rendered.
49
In Greenbie v. Noble,50 plaintiff was the author of the book
My Fair Lady, based on the life of Anna Ella Carrol. He brought
an action for damages for infringement against the defendant, who
had written and caused to be published a similar book. The defend-
ant alleged misuse of copyrights based upon (1) depositing certain
documents in the Maryland Historical Society and, thereby, keeping
the materials out of the public domain and (2) controlling the copy-
right for My Fair Lady to preempt motion picture and fictional
rights. The court held that the alleged misuse was no defense, since
such deposit or control did not give the plaintiff a monopoly on the
story of the life of Anna Ella Carrol. Therefore, it could not be used
by her to extend it beyond its proper scope and, in fact, plaintiff
did not enlarge the scope of the copyright monopoly so as to em-
brace features not covered by the copyright.
44 Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fowley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cer. denied, 321 U.S.
785 (1943).
45 See Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947), where a similar attempt
to sue on graphic charts was considered a monopoly extension.
46347 U.S. 201 (1954).
47 Id. at 219, citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
48 Id., 347 U.S. at 219, citing Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
49 Id., 347 U.S. at 219.
50 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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Later, in Ideal Toy Corp. v. J-Cey Doll Co.,51 an interesting
application of the misuse defense was based on an attempt to extend
copyright protection. The plaintiff copyrighted a "Saucy Walker"
doll, a doll having a distinctive head, and placed a copyright notice
on the shoulder blades and at the nape of the neck, adjacent to the
hairline. The defendant infringer asserted that because the doll's
body had been published previously without a copyright notice, this
subsequent notation was an attempt to extend the copyright pro-
tection to the doll's torso, as distinguished from the entire doll. The
court dismissed this argument without discussion and allowed plain-
tiff recovery for infringement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Misconduct in acquiring material, and in the type of material
copyrighted, was clearly established early in copyright actions as
a valid defense for an infringer under the doctrine of "unclean
hands." Initial refusal to consider anti-trust violation within this
doctrine appears to have excluded all conduct which would have
been considered misuse.
Several factors supporting the misuse defense were noted in
the more recent decisions. These include: (1) successful assertion of
misuse as a defense, (2) characterization of copyright licensing
practices in anti-trust actions as monopoly extensions, (3) allow-
ance of anti-trust violations as valid defenses and (4) consideration
of various monopoly extension arguments.
The practice of grouping copyrighted performing rights in
ASCAP, and sharing in the rewards, was held to be a copyright
misuse in M. Witmark and Sons, one of two cases found where the
misuse defense was successfully asserted. In private actions for anti-
trust violations, the courts devoted considerable time to the ques-
tion of copyright monopoly extension. It is significant that activities
such as blockbooking of films and blanket licensing of performing
rights were clearly condemned as copyright monopoly extensions.
The indication, by more recent decisions, that the Harms case
rule, which excludes anti-trust violations from the "unclean hands"
defense, is no longer followed gives substantial weight to the pro-
position that there is a misuse defense. The Alfred Bell case, one
instance where the misuse defense was adopted, accepted price fix-
ing as a misuse. Although it is questionable whether the balancing
test adopted in that case indicates use of "unclean hands," it is be-
lieved that application of some of the earlier "unclean hands" tests
would have allowed application of the doctrine of misuse.
It is significant that in recent decisions the courts have given
careful consideration to an assertion by an infringer that the copy-
right proprietor has extended his monopoly. The most important
of these cases is the full consideration of misuse given by the Su-
preme Court in 1954, in Mazer v. Stein.
In view of these factors, it is suggested that the doctrine of
"unclean hands" does extend to misuse in copyright actions. How-
ever, in view of the limited number of decisions on this precise
issue, the character of misconduct which might amount to misuse
is by no means yet defined.
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